This paper presents a case for not diverting additional Transportation Security Administration (TSA) resources from Civil Aviation security to General Aviation (GA) security. It acknowledges that the TSA spends very little on GA security even though Al-Qaeda retains the capability to conduct strategic attacks using GA aircraft. In developing the argument against diverting resources, the author reviews three reasons why Al-Qaeda will not use GA aircraft in a strategic strike against the U.S. Firstly, other methods are available that are both easier to execute and would cause more damage than a GA attack. Secondly, attacking the U.S. homeland is against Al-Qaeda's operational interests because doing so would bring the American people back into the fight. Finally, attacking the U.S. homeland is against Al-Qaeda's operational interests because doing so would reverse its successes in gaining international support for the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Because Al-Qaeda will not strike the U.S. homeland using GA aircraft, TSA should not divert additional resources from Civil Aviation security to General Aviation security.
Preparing for the Next Kamikaze Attack on the American Homeland
2007
29 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
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