Current US military doctrine underemphasizes the serious problem of accidental shootdown of friendly and neutral aircraft. The doctrine depends on total air superiority to reduce the risk of aviation fratricide, but this is not always achievable. Future combat environments will increase the risk of aviation fratricide and make incidents more costly. Aviation fratricide affects all levels of war, but operational level commanders control many of the contributing factors. Measures to prevent shootdowns must not decrease integration or aggressiveness in combat, yet the current environment of casualty sensitivity and emphasis on joint and combined integration makes zero incidents the only acceptable goal. Operational leaders can only accomplish this if they reject the ideas that aviation fratricide is inevitable and that technology alone is the solution. Increased awareness, through publications and improved documentation and reporting, is the first step of this process. The second step is for operational commanders to consider aviation fratricide contributing factors throughout the planning, preparation, and execution phases of war.


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