The naval operation at the Battle for Leyte Gulf is analyzed by comparing today's concept of the operational art with the command organizations, operation plans, and operational designs of the U.S. and Japanese naval forces of 1944. The fleet actions are examined to determine the operational failures and to validate current operational principles. The principle finding in examining the planning and execution of the U.S. and Japanese forces is the lack of unity of command, which limited force effectiveness in command, control, and communications.
Operations Analysis: The Battle for Leyte Gulf
1993
32 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Education, Law, & Humanities , Naval operations , History , Battles , Planning , United States , Japan , Command control communications , Operational art , Strategic environments , Fleet action , Operation plans , Leyte Gulf(Battle-1944) , World War 2 , Command organizations , Operational designs , Operations Analysis
Gulf Match catches fire - The battle for Arabian Gulf traffic is set to hot up
British Library Online Contents | 1997
Offshore Helicopter Operations - Gulf of Mexico
SAE Technical Papers | 1982
|Airborne Battle Management System & Autonomous Operations UAV Autonomy MMIs
British Library Conference Proceedings | 2001
|