The impact on the Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations resulting from the shutdown of all en route primary radars (except for ARSR-4s) within the CONUS interior will result in loss of real-time weather data and aircraft skin tracking, over 33 percent primary surveillance loss of coverage in the CONUS, and an increase in the accident rate of one accident in 11 years as predicted on recent statistics. The report concludes that real-time weather data, while of limited quality, must be retained until it can be replaced by data from the NEXRAD weather radar or other weather data source. Ability to track non-transponder equipped aircraft is significant but less critical and can be minimized by other system improvements. These include: better beacon radar (Mode S) in combination with Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS); increased transponder equipage; reduced altitude for non-transponder equipped aircraft to 10 thousand feet; increased DF network to 370 sites; and better siting of beacon-only antennas.
Impact of Shutting Down En Route Primary Radars within CONUS Interior
1993
46 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Air Transportation , Transportation Safety , Radiofrequency Detection , Aeronautics , Air traffic control , Collision avoidance , Radar tracking , Transponders , Weather intelligence , Cost analysis , Economic analysis , Radar beacons , Aircraft safety , Accident prevention , Replacing , CONUS(Continental United States) , ARSR(Air Route Surveillance Radars) , NEXRAD(Next Generation Weather Radar)
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