This memorandum explores the relationship between civil defense, national vulnerabilities and the deterrence of nuclear warfare between the Soviet Union and the United States. The author examines the problems and effectiveness of the major elements of Soviet civil defenses (leadership and population protection; industrial protection; and postattack recovery) to determine whether, and to what extent, the Soviet capabilities undermine crisis stability and deterrence. The proposals of the Carter (PD-41) and Reagan (NSDD-26) administrations to strengthen deterrence and to reduce national destruction should deterrence fail are evaluated to determine whether the United States should augment and modernize its civil defenses. Americans will evacuate high risk areas in the event of a crisis, and it remains the responsibility of government to minimize the chaos and moderate the effects with some prior planning. The costs of such plans, relative to competing strategic military systems and programs, are rather modest. The author is skeptical, however, about the utility and cost-effectiveness of the extensive blast shelter program advocated by some civil defense proponents in the United States. (Author)
Strategic Implications of Civil Defense
1983
50 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Nuclear Warfare , Military Sciences , International Relations , Emergency Services & Planning , Civil defense , Strategic analysis , Vulnerability , Western security(International) , United States , USSR , Nuclear warfare , Deterrence , Postattack operations , Crisis management , Relocation , Balance of power , Recovery , Protection , Evacuation , Soviet civil defense , Strategic balance , Postattack recovery
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