Desert Storm brought to light the potential capability of theater ballistic missiles. During the War, SCUD missiles were used by the Iraqis in an attempt to alter the strategic balance. Fortunately, coalition forces were able to negate the effect of the ballistic missiles through air attacks and the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. Based on the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed theater missile defense (TMD) doctrine to serve as a guide to operational commanders for countering ballistic missiles in the future. This doctrine calls for unity of effort at the operational level by coordination of the component commanders. Past experience points to the fact that a common commander is necessary for unity of effort. Therefore, because of the large number of joint forces required to counter ballistic missiles and the need to work towards a common objective, the TXD doctrine should reflect the requirement for a missile defense commander. (MM).
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. The Need for an Operational Commander
1995
26 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Military Sciences , Common Carrier & Satellite , Antimissile defense systems , Command and control systems , Joint military activities , Military intelligence , Military doctrine , Theses , Surface to air missiles , Military commanders , Surface to surface missiles , Desert storm operation , Scud missiles , Patriot missiles , Theater missile defense
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