The employment of the Joint Force Air Component Commander Concept during Operation Desert Storm raised a number of issues. After-action reports highlight communications difficulties between the JFACC and the Naval aviation forces operating in the theater. The existing joint doctrine regarding the JFACC states that normally the service component with the preponderance of air assets and the ability to assume the function will be designated as JFACC. Because it failed to provide any more definitive guidance, joint doctrine assumed that different service components would perform as JFACC in more or less the same manner. However, the Navy and the Air Force developed dissimilar philosophies regarding the command and control of tactical air assets and subsequently procured communications systems to support their own philosophies. This produced interoperability problems during Desert Storm. The communications problems which occurred were the product of inadequate joint doctrine and the service components' insistence on employing their individual service doctrines/philosophies during a joint operation. Air Operations, Joint Force Air Component Commander, Communications.
Improving JFACC: Doctrine and Communications
1992
26 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Common Carrier & Satellite , Joint military activities , Command control communications , Aerial warfare , Air force , Control , Doctrine , Guidance , Interoperability , Naval aviation , Navy , Military doctrine , Military planning , Military operations , DESERT STORM Operation
NTIS | 1993
|MAGTF Air Assets and the JFACC
NTIS | 2000
|Area Air Defense Commander: Can JFACC Do It All
NTIS | 1999
|There is More to JFACC Than an ATO
NTIS | 1995
|JFACC Problems Associated with Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm
Online Contents | 1994
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