A novel post-fabrication side channel detection method is devised to uncover potential malicious covert modifications to microelectronic circuits. The detection technique does not require a golden trojan free circuit, is insensitive to process variations and environmental changes, and is able to detect very small stealthy trojan circuits. The approach involves segmenting the circuit into parts, with each segment having equal (or nearly equal) and consistent leakage currents under specific static input patterns. Covert Hardware Trojan insertion is detected based on measuring the differences of leakage current between segments with the specified static input patterns.


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    Titel :

    Post-Fabrication Side Channel Malicious Detection for 16X16 Booth Multiplier in 65nm CMOS Technology


    Beteiligte:
    Vissamsetty, Kanchan (Autor:in) / Ren, Saiyu (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    15.07.2024


    Format / Umfang :

    1005825 byte





    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch



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