Previous work (Yamauchi et al., PRE 79 and Nakata et al., Physica A 389) found several social-dilemma structures in phases of traffic flows created by bottlenecks resulting from lane closings. We investigate another question: whether or not such structures can be formed from frequent lane changes in a usual traffic flow without any explicit bottlenecks. In our model system, two classes of driver-agents coexist: C-agents (cooperative strategy) always remain in the lane they are initially assigned, while D-agents (defective strategy) try to change lanes to move ahead. In relatively high-density flows, such as the metastable and high-density phases, we found structures that correspond to either n-person Prisoner's Dilemma (n-PD) games or to quasi-PD games. In these situations, lane changes by D-agents create heavy traffic jams that reduce social efficiency.
Traffic flow simulation dovetailed with evolutionary game theory
01.08.2014
224826 byte
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Traffic flow macroscopic characteristic implementation method based on evolutionary game
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