Authenticate Key Agreement Protocol is a crucial and yet imperative Cryptographic parameter to establish a secure transaction over a public channel. To land such secured transaction a Three Party Authenticate Key Agreement Protocol is the procedure where a Secured server verifies the authenticity of a genuine user. There is an ample number of scholars working on Three Party Authenticate Key Agreement Protocols. In recent past, Chen-et al designed a new Three Party Password based Authenticate Key Exchange Protocol which is secured against the Stolen-Smart-Card Attack and User Impersonation Attack. It means even though a smart card of a genuine user gets lost and an adversary finds it, he is unable to launch any kind of Attack. Unfortunately Chen et. al. $\mathrm{\pmb{s}}$ protocol remains unforeseeable to achieve User Anonymity. This User Anonymity problem makes their protocol vulnerable towards the DOS-Attack and it becomes more prone to it. In this paper we explain how Chen et. al.'s protocol is endangered to DOS-ATTACK as it lacks to reach out for User Anonymity.
Cryptanalysis of a Three-Party Password Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Resistant to Stolen Smart Card Attacks
2018-03-01
1712110 byte
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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