We propose a method for enhancing cybersecurity in spacecraft operations by analyzing and reducing the attack surface of flight software. We advocate for reducing complexity in the software architecture and adopting more secure architectural principles to mitigate vulnerabilities and make spacecraft more resilient against cyber attacks. By utilizing a systematic approach, we scrutinize key areas, such as the real-time operating system (RTOS) and operating system abstraction layer (OSAL), and develop mitigations for issues we find. This study's findings suggest strategies for simplifying abstractions to make them more secure, addressing implementation issues, and providing supporting evidence for moving to a more resilient architectural approach.
Attack Surface Analysis for Spacecraft Flight Software
15.07.2024
261031 byte
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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