AbstractGrandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing slot-use ratio is less than one.


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    Titel :

    Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots


    Beteiligte:
    Sieg, Gernot (Autor:in)

    Erschienen in:

    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2009-04-16


    Format / Umfang :

    9 pages




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch




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