AbstractThis paper proposes a game theoretic framework for the problem of designing an uncapacitated railway transit network in the presence of link failures and a competing mode. It is assumed that when a link fails, another path or another transportation mode is provided to transport passengers between the endpoints of the affected link. The goal is to build a network that optimizes a certain utility function when failures occur. The problem is posed as a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game with perfect information. The saddle points of the corresponding mixed enlarged game yield robust network designs.


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    Titel :

    A game theoretic framework for the robust railway transit network design problem


    Beteiligte:
    Laporte, Gilbert (Autor:in) / Mesa, Juan A. (Autor:in) / Perea, Federico (Autor:in)

    Erschienen in:

    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2009-08-31


    Format / Umfang :

    13 pages




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch





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