AbstractThis paper presents a bilevel transit fare equilibrium model for a deregulated transit system. In the upper-level problem, the transit competition is portrayed as an n-player, non-cooperative game by changing the fare structure of each of a set of transit lines separately so as to maximize the profit of each transit operator within the oligopolistic market. We show that there exists a generalized Nash game between transit operators, which can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem. In the lower-level problem, the passengers’ response to the equilibrium fare structure of the transit operators is represented by the stochastic user equilibrium transit assignment model with elastic OD demand. As a result, the bilevel transit fare equilibrium problem is presented in the Stackelberg form and solved by a heuristic solution algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach. A numerical example is given to illustrate the competition mechanism on the transit network and some useful findings are presented on competitive operations.
The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological ; 39 , 6 ; 519-544
2004-07-27
26 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand
Online Contents | 2005
|A network equilibrium model for oligopolistic competition in city bus services
Online Contents | 1998
|A Generalized Nash Equilibrium network model for post-disaster humanitarian relief
Online Contents | 2016
|Nash Equilibrium Analysis Based on a Generalized Travel Cost
Trans Tech Publications | 2014
|