Highlights The outcome is a network of three break-bulk terminals. Consolidation facilities could benefit a fragmented freight industry very much. The intervention of the public sector as investor proves necessary. Logistic facilities can attract also private capitals. The design process adds a new terminal if demand rises by 30%.

    Abstract This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. It focuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location pattern and public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between the designer and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem, at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of the lower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that private companies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore, transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fully economies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.


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    Titel :

    A Stackelberg-game approach to support the design of logistic terminals


    Beteiligte:
    Catalano, Mario (Autor:in) / Migliore, Marco (Autor:in)

    Erschienen in:

    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2014-01-01


    Format / Umfang :

    11 pages




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch





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