Managing large-scale transportation infrastructure projects is difficult due to frequent misinformation about the costs which results in large cost overruns that often threaten the overall project viability. This paper investigates the explanations for cost overruns that are given in the literature. Overall, four categories of explanations can be distinguished: technical, economic, psychological, and political. Political explanations have been seen to be the most dominant explanations for cost overruns. Agency theory is considered the most interesting for political explanations and an eclectic theory is also considered possible. Non-political explanations are diverse in character, therefore a range of different theories (including rational choice theory and prospect theory), depending on the kind of explanation is considered more appropriate than one all-embracing theory.


    Zugriff

    Download


    Exportieren, teilen und zitieren



    Titel :

    Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness


    Beteiligte:
    Chantal C. Cantarelli (Autor:in) / Bent Flyvbjerg (Autor:in) / Eric J.E. Molin (Autor:in) / Bert van Wee (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2010




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Unbekannt




    Explaining cost overruns of large-scale transportation infrastructure projects using a signalling game

    Cantarelli, Chantal C. / Chorus, Caspar G. / Cunningham, Scott W. | Taylor & Francis Verlag | 2013



    How common and how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects?

    Flyvbjerg, Bent / Skamris holm, Mette K. / Buhl, Søren L. | Taylor & Francis Verlag | 2003


    Curbing cost overruns in infrastructure investment

    Jung Eun Park | DOAJ | 2021

    Freier Zugriff

    Cost overruns in transportation infrastructure projects: Sowing the seeds for a probabilistic theory of causation

    Love, Peter E.D. / Ahiaga-Dagbui, Dominic D. / Irani, Zahir | Elsevier | 2016