In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game-theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic, continuous-time replicator equation on a community network is coupled with a closed dynamic flow process between communities, in turn governed by an environmental feedback mechanism. When such a mechanism is independent of the game-theoretic learning process, a closed-loop system of differential equations is obtained. Through a direct analysis of the system, we study its asymptotic behavior. Specifically, we prove that, if the learning process converges, it converges to a (possibly restricted) Nash equilibrium of the game, even when the dynamic flow process does not converge. Moreover, for a class of population games-two-strategy matrix games- a Lyapunov argument is employed to establish an evolutionary folk theorem that guarantees convergence to a subset of Nash equilibria, that is, the evolutionary stable states of the game. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate and corroborate our findings.
Population games on dynamic community networks
01.01.2022
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
DDC: | 629 |
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