Aiming to merge traffic flow analysis with evolutionary game theory, we investigated the question of whether such structures can be formed from frequent lane changes in usual traffic flow without any explicit bottlenecks. In our model system, two classes of driver-agents coexist: C-agents (cooperative strategy) always remain in the lane they are initially assigned, whereas D-agents (defective strategy) try to change lanes to move ahead. In relatively high-density flows, such as the metastable and high-density phases, we found structures that correspond to either n-person prisoner dilemma (n-PD) games or quasi-PD games. In these situations, lane changes by D-agents create heavy traffic jams that reduce social efficiency.
Social dilemma structures hidden behind traffic flow with lane changes
Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment (Online) ; 2014 , 7 ; P07019/1-P07019/14
2014
14 Seiten, 16 Quellen
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Englisch
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