In this paper the main activities at the development of system requirements specifications have been derived from demands of new European standards in railway area and from the international generic standard concerning safety critical systems. Not only a safe system requirements specification has to be achieved but also it has to be demonstrated that a safe system specification is achieved in system requirements specification according to these standards. To obtain evidence of safety the importance of risk analysis and the importance of evidence of safe functionality according to standards have been shown. A precise system model is the basis for both activities. The UML notation can be used to specify a precise and clearly understandable system model, which is exact, unambiguous and compact as well as easily understandable by developers, operation authority, supervising authority and assessors. On the one hand this is the basis to support risk analysis in an efficient way. The several steps of risk analysis necessary for preparation of a system requirements specification have been explained. The meaning of the safety analysis techniques ETA, FTA and FMEA as part of risk analysis has been introduced. On the other hand a precise system model in UML enables correctness and refutation checks related to the fulfilment of safety requirements. By risk analysis the identification of safety requirements can be supported. Using safety patterns, engineers who are no experts in higher logic, are able to specify and to interpret correctly safety requirements in formal specification languages, what is recommended by standards, as well as precise specifications in natural language. In this way safety patterns are a connecting link between specifications in natural language and formal specifications. Within the scope of the DFG project SafeRail a theory and tool prototypes have been developed for consistence and refutation checks between UML statecharts and functional safety requirements specified by using safety patterns. In case of detected failures the system model has to be changed. A correct system model related to safety is the basis for risk assessment. Further on there will be developed conversions, which provide the full expressive power of UML statecharts. In addition information of UML class diagrams shall be considered according to semantics described in the literature.


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    Titel :

    Process model for the development of system requirements specifications for railway systems


    Beteiligte:
    Bitsch, F. (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2003


    Format / Umfang :

    16 Seiten, 8 Bilder, 21 Quellen




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Print


    Sprache :

    Englisch





    Process Model for the Development of a System Requirements Specification for Railway Systems

    Bitsch, F. / Zentrum fur Verkehr der Technischen Universitat Braunschweig / Verein Deutscher Ingenieure | British Library Conference Proceedings | 2003


    Electric railway specifications

    Engineering Index Backfile | 1895


    Deriving Safety-critical System Specifications through Requirements Engineering Process

    Tsuchiya, R. / Hirao, Y. / Fukuda, M. et al. | British Library Online Contents | 1998


    Specifications for railway employes

    Lemon, Charles H. | Engineering Index Backfile | 1917