Facing the requirements of environmental protection, enterprises may face the dual pressure of carbon emission reduction and capital shortage. In a one-to-one supply chain with capital constraints, two financing schemes are introduced: one is debt financing which considers the autocorrelation between the interest rate and emission reductions, and the other is equity financing. We establish a Stackelberg game model that takes the dual-sensitive demand of price and carbon emission reduction, to discuss the value and motivation of each participant in financing. Then we analyze the impact of cap-and-trade regulation on financing decisions. The results show that the capital constraints of the supplier will inhibit his willingness to reduce emissions. The lower the level of funds, the stronger the inhibition. When the interest rate is low, both the retailer and the supplier have the motivation to accept debt financing. The realization of equity financing value depends on the supplier's capital level and dividend proportion. Also, the higher the carbon price, the higher the benefit from debt financing or equity financing for supply chain members. In particular, when the carbon price is high, both parties will prefer debt financing. With the decrease of the carbon price, equity financing is best. Besides, the higher the degree of the supplier's capital constraints, the greater the possibility of reaching a consensus on the financing scheme.
Supply Chain Financing Decision and Financing Value Under Cap-and-Trade Regulation
Lect. Notes Electrical Eng.
International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Engineering ; 2021 ; Beijing, China October 29, 2021 - October 31, 2021
2021 6th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Engineering (ICITE 2021) ; Kapitel : 69 ; 781-795
2022-06-01
15 pages
Aufsatz/Kapitel (Buch)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Financing a capital-constrained supply chain: Equity or debt
Elsevier | 2024
|BOOK REVIEWS - Financing China Trade and Investment
Online Contents | 1999
|