The complexity of technical systems increased immensely over the past decades. Where those technical systems were often mainly mechanical ones in the past, hardware and especially software have become the main driving forces today.
In the 1970s, defects of a system which resulted in injuries, severe injuries or even deaths could be mainly attributed to technical component failures. The “low” complexity of systems at that time didn’t reach a level, where losses due to component interactions where of huge concern. Today, the safety industries (automotive, avionics, medical, etc.) have become quite experienced in dealing with issues related to component failures. With the use of qualitative and quantitative safety analysis like FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, FMEDA etc., losses due to technical component failures have been heavily reduced. But, where today we reduced the risks of component failures, the risks of losses due to complex system designs, and therefore complex component interactions heavily increased. This paper will show, how the method of system-theoretic process analysis can help to cover these issues. How the gaps in our safety efforts, regarding the belief of the system about its environment, can be closed, rather than just focusing on failure of components and their performance.
Why Current Safety Analysis Methods Fail at Covering Lethal System Designs
Proceedings
2021-08-03
13 pages
Aufsatz/Kapitel (Buch)
Elektronische Ressource
Deutsch