Flight crew confusion, excessive stressworkload, and ineffective Crew Resource Management among other issues arising from dependence on automated systems on the flight deck have been identified as major causal factors in multiple fatal accidents, significant incidents and near misses. Many Loss of Control events have been traced to display of erroneous flight data and auto-flight system mode status to the crew. Safety was compromised by not having sufficiently obvious and unambiguous information available in order to permit quick diagnosis of aircraft status and then appropriate action to regain control of the aircraft energy state or trajectory. Continually evolving training and operational requirements related to aircraft automation have also presented critical challenges to commercial aviation. During times of high demand and low supply of experienced pilots (which is today the case in South-East Asia, for instance), basic training in manual flight may be minimal and as low as a few hundred flight hours on light aircraft before beginning training on advanced, highly automated aircraft. Predominant use of automation may cause aircrew trained in this way to have trouble performing traditionally simple operations such as manually switching to other runways or overriding the autopilot in tight situations. Inadequate crew training andor experience coupled with attempted manual flight in highly automated airplanes may more easily lead to loss of aircraft control in unusual situations such as high-altitude stallsupsets, traffic avoidance or maneuvering. Loss of basic piloting skills through increasing dependence on automation may exacerbate this problem. Finally, design changes by nature take a long time and are very costly. Incorporating novel automated functionality into new aircraft designs is technically feasible and desirable. However, it may take many years for these changes to have a significant impact on tomorrows fleet, given the time it takes to develop a new aircraft and for these aircraft to become a significant fraction of the fleet. This paper will review and summarize the findings and recommendations from a 2004 study of the topic, Increasing reliance on flight deck automation conducted by the Future Aviation Safety Team at the behest of the Joint Safety Strategy Initiative (JSSI) within the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) organization that existed at the time. Although this study was conducted more than ten years ago, its findings and recommendations are as relevant now as then and into the future.


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    Titel :

    Transformational Phenomena as Predictors of Aircraft Accidents: What Goes Around Comes Around


    Beteiligte:

    Kongress:

    Safety and Automation in Aviation ; 2015 ; Brussels, Belgium


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2015-09-01


    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Keine Angabe


    Sprache :

    Englisch




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