Unlike the Roman engineer Sextus Julius Frontinus, B.H. Liddell Hart seems to have understood the changing nature of war. Indeed, his position regarding air power and the proper strategy in war shifted slightly from post- World War I to post World War II. Following World War I, he believed that air power could prove to be an excellent arm to prosecute his indirect approach strategy. He revised that thinking after witnessing World War II, believing that air power was not advantageous in prosecuting the war against civil objectives. Since that time, however, aircraft have acquired the ability to drop bombs with uncanny accuracy-culminating in a 99.6% 'hit' rate in Operation Allied Force, NATO's 1999 air campaign against Serbia. Drawing on the execution of Operation Allied Force, this paper will argue that the air war against Serbia provides a good example of Liddell Hart's indirect approach, overcoming the shortcomings he cited in World War II. To fully explore this thesis, we must first look briefly at Liddell Hart's background and flush out his views on strategy, the objective in war, and air power's merits relative to the objective. Next, this paper will examine Operation Allied Force, highlighting areas that demonstrate the indirect approach as well as areas that fall short of Liddell Hart's ideal. Finally, this paper will hypothesize the possible implications for future U.S. military campaigns.
Operation Allied Force: Bringing Liddell Hart Full Circle
2000
16 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
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