Each Orbiter Vehicle (Space Shuttle Program) contains up to 24 Kevlar49/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) for storage of pressurized gases. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return To Flight (RTF) activities, Orbiter engineers reexamined COPV flight certification. The original COPV design calculations were updated to include recently declassified Kevlar COPV test data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and to incorporate changes in how the Space Shuttle was operated as opposed to orinigially envisioned. 2005 estimates for the probability of a catastrophic failure over the life of the program (from STS-1 through STS-107) were one-in-five. To address this unacceptable risk, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) initiated a comprehensive investigation to understand and mitigate this risk. First, the team considered and eventually deemed unfeasible procuring and replacing all existing flight COPVs. OPO replaced the two vessels with the highest risk with existing flight spare units. Second, OPO instituted operational improvements in ground procedures to signficiantly reduce risk, without adversely affecting Shuttle capability. Third, OPO developed a comprehensive model to quantify the likelihood of occurrance.


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    Titel :

    Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program


    Beteiligte:
    M. T. Kezirian (Autor:in) / K. L. Johnson (Autor:in) / S. L. Phoenix (Autor:in)

    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2011


    Format / Umfang :

    12 pages


    Medientyp :

    Report


    Format :

    Keine Angabe


    Sprache :

    Englisch