In the months leading up to the Tet offensive and the siege of Khe Sanh, General William C. Westmoreland (the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) came to the conclusion that existing arrangements no longer enabled him to effectively coordinate and direct the air teams of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in the northern part of the country. The solution was to place fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft under one manager. The officer selected was the Commander, 7th Air Force, which brought remonstrance from Navy and Marine commanders. In the ensuing debate, Westmoreland held that his concept did not affect service doctrine, roles, or missions. The concept was adopted in the event despite continued squabbling among the Joint Chiefs and field commanders while the control of air assets in I Corps unarguably improved.
Single Manager for Air in Vietnam
1994
12 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Education, Law, & Humanities , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Common Carrier & Satellite , Management personnel , Conflict , Tactical air support , Command and control systems , Air power , Air force personnel , Vietnam war , Centralized , Reconnaissance aircraft , Korean war , Second world war , Bomber aircraft , Military planning , Military commanders , Navy , Marine corps , Air force , Military history , Fighter aircraft , Reprints , Interservice disputes , Centralized control , Interservice conflict , Interservice rivalry , Westmoreland william c , Single manager controversy , Macv(Military assistance command-vietnam) , Joint chiefs of staff , Momyer william m
Program Manager: Single Process Initiative
NTIS | 1998
Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition
NTIS | 1981
Single Manager Assignment for Ocean Transportation
NTIS | 1967
|The Single Air Manager Controversy of 1968
British Library Conference Proceedings | 2001
|