Given a range of alternate futures for the Mediterranean Basin, what should be the optimal U.S. naval presence deployed to that region. How should the Combatant Commander (EUCOM) and his Naval Component Commander (COMUSNAVEUR) employ these forces to maximize both an effective shaping of the maritime area of operations, and effective response to instabilities and crises. The United States must continue to maintain a permanent United States Navy and Marine Corps presence in the Mediterranean Sea for two significant reasons: in order to continue to develop critical theater security cooperation and to give the Commander, European Command relevant flexible deterrent options that are properly positioned for crisis response. Furthermore, the United States will be unable to exercise sea control and effectively shape the Mediterranean maritime area of responsibility without permanent, forward naval presence. For the purposes of this paper, the term naval forces will be used in the broadest sense, to include United States Navy ships, United States Marine Corps expeditionary forces, and United States Coast Guard forces. Although many dynamic drivers will influence our future Mediterranean deployment strategy, this much is certain: we must continue to command the seas and airspace there, and we cannot do this without a permanent, visible, and powerful naval presence made up of either a Carrier Strike Group, an Expeditionary Strike Group, or other significant strike forces on the scene.
Future Naval Presence for the Mediterranean and Black Sea Basins
2004
18 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
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