For the last two major conflicts in which the Marine Corps has been engaged (Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom), it lost a significant amount of training and preparation time due to the need to reorganize its infantry units into mechanized forces to be able to move across the vast distance both missions required. This is because the Marine Corps' peacetime organization does not have an infantry unit with organic mechanized assets attached. The Corps has identified the requirement to fight far beyond the littorals and move great distances inland. However, it has failed to see the need to continuously train with the assets that will allow it to do so. Fighting from rapidly moving armored personnel carriers (APC) is a perishable skill that infantryman must continually train with to be successful on the battlefield. Therefore, the Corps must commission a dedicated mechanized infantry unit(s) to allow it to fight with better trained personnel and preplanned logistical support inherent to a dedicated mechanized force.
Fighting from Rapidly Moving Armored Personnel
2005
13 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Chemical, Biological, & Radiological Warfare , Armored personnel carriers , Mechanization , Organizational realignment , Marine corps training , Amphibious operations , Infantry , Marine corps , Regiment level organizations , Prepositioning(Logistics) , Amphibious vehicles , Proficiency , Marine corps personnel , Integration , Battalion level organizations , Skills , Mechanized infantry , Amphibious assault vehicle units , Infantry regiments , Amphibious assault battalions , Aav(Amphibious assault vehicles) , Efv(Expeditionary fighting vehicles)
Kraftfahrwesen | 1978
Kraftfahrwesen | 1981
|Improving the M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier
Kraftfahrwesen | 1980
|Development of Armored Personnel Carrier M113A1E1
SAE Technical Papers | 1979
|