This study used a prospective design to assess whether 12 items from the Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) can be used to differentiate between U.S. Naval aviation squadrons who have had a mishap within a recent period of time, and those that have not. Logistic regression modeling was carried out using the survey responses of U.S. Naval aircrew (n = 23,442) and mishap data. The models that were used to attempt to predict severe and moderately severe mishaps together performed better than the models that used subsets of the mishap data. It was found that three of the CSAS items had some limited value in predicting mishap risk. Personnel in squadrons with a low probability of mishap more strongly agree with the need to monitor personnel and integrate safety and operations than aircrew in squadrons with a higher probability of mishap. However, the aircrew in squadrons with a higher probability of mishap also more strongly agree that persistent rule violators will jeopardize their career compared to personnel in squadrons with a low probability of mishaps. This finding suggests that blame and punishment are not constructive in efforts to promote safety at work. This study would seem to support the premise that safety climate and safety performance are weakly related. It is recommended that researchers would be better advised to attempt to establish the discriminate validity of their questionnaire through self- reported safety attitudes and behaviors, rather than mishap data.


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