Theoretically, a Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment would be consistent with Soviet military doctrine, Russian-Soviet tradition, and the current military environment in which Soviet strategy must operate. Practically, however, any Soviet ABM decision will be encumbered by a number of constraints-- particularly competing demands upon the limited Soviet economy. It is doubtful that the Soviets could move, on a crash basis, into a large-scale ABM development and deployment program without doing serious harm to important domestic, military, and foreign commitments. The 'proximity consciousness' which traditionally has influenced Russian-Soviet strategy may suggest a somewhat limited role for potential ABM deployment; namely, defense against the more modest threat posed by Nth countries of the future (e.g., Western Europe generally, West Germany particularly, and ultimately Communist China). Until now, the Soviets have played their ABM publicity in a markedly low key. Their statements thus far yield no indication of any intent to move into a crash program of extensive ABM deployment. (Author)
Ballistic Missile Defense and Soviet Strategy
1963
2 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Soviet Concepts of Ballistic Missile Defense
NTIS | 1988
|Potential Soviet Compromise on Ballistic Missile Defense
NTIS | 1989
|NTIS | 1995
|NTIS | 2022
|NTIS | 1996