This monograph examines whether the operational air defense force for theater ballistic missile defense will be capable of conducting operations on future battlefields. To explore relevant issues in this area, historical examples from World War 1, World War 11, and Operation Desert Storm are cited as lessons learned. An examination of the Operational Air Defense Battlefield Operating Systems as specified in TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 serves as a baseline for comparison between currently fielded air defense organizations and materiel against their ability to accomplish the mission assigned them. The study determines that American maneuver forces are vulnerable to engagement from ballistic missiles. Current theater air defense systems and organizations are severely limited in their ability to engage ballistic missiles at their maximum effective ranges without endangering the lives of American soldiers and our allies. Organization and materiel solutions to the problem are required. The study concludes that the Army must continue to develop and field a complementary system of theater air defense weapon systems that can destroy the full spectrum of theater ballistic missiles. The Department of Defense should create a separate theater missile defense organization from existing forces to control antimissile forces in wartime. During peacetime this organization should prepare theater missile defense doctrine and serve as the combat developer for all operational antimissile materiel systems. We must continue to advance our technological edge to negate a hostile nation's ability to employ weapons of mass destruction against the United States and her allies. We must adapt our organizations in conjunction with our technology to guarantee our ability to defeat the.


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    Theater Missile Defense

    Przemieniecki, J.S. | AIAA | 2000


    Theater Missile Defense

    J. L. Newman | NTIS | 1998