In January 1991, one of the most successful wars in America's history commenced. Logisticians overcame in an extraordinary way what General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the theater commander, called a 'daunting task.' Logistics did three things: built the theater infrastructure, sustained a victorious military campaign, and closed out the theater of war by bringing personnel and materiel home. The discussion that follows is based on the assumption that the reader is familiar with the Desert Storm campaign. Therefore, details of tactical operations are omitted. At the start of the war, General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke in simple terms: ' We are going to cut it off and kill it.' Put into a military context, he revealed the operational concept for the upcoming campaign. This paper provides a framework for discussing the role of operational logistics in the ground phase of the Gulf War. It addresses the essential logistical differences between forward-deployed forces and power projection forces; the elements of operational art as the connector between strategy and tactics; and logistics in an operational setting in Southwest Asia. The conclusions suggest considerations of operational logistics which will be important in future deployments. Indirectly, closer integration of logistics into campaign planning, particulary the concepts of operations, maneuver and reserves, is suggested.


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    Operational Logistics

    M. C. Lopez | NTIS | 2001


    Talking logistics in the Gulf

    Online Contents | 2011



    Transforming Joint Operational-Level Logistics

    M. W. Akin / G. L. Topic | NTIS | 2007