What started out as an experimental fighter aircraft designed to take advantage of advances in aerospace engine technology and to keep up with the new bombing aircraft of the time, the P-38 was thrust into production as the United States scrambled to produce fighter aircraft during the Second World War. Under these circumstances, solid integration, risk and scope management would have prevented the problems of engine reliability, compressibility and insufficient cockpit heat that resulted from the accelerated production, testing and fielding schedule, As a result, the operator in the Northern Europe was burdened with an aircraft that did not meet his needs. What was true in 1939 for the P-38 is true today for the F-35, when we pursue advances in technology, we must clearly understand the warfighter's needs, wants and expectations, integrate all stakeholders into the development process, and have a strategy to mitigate potential adverse events.


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    Lift-Fan Aircraft: Lessons Learned

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    V-STOL Aircraft Lessons Learned

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    Aircraft Systems Design: Lessons Learned from SFAR 88

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    Aircraft Systems Design: Lessons Learned from SFAR 88

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