In A+B procurement auctions the buyer's utility is linear and the bidders' utility is assumed to be quasi-linear. If this assumption is met, then a successful auction may conclude with an efficient winning bid which maximizes both the buyer's utility and social welfare. If this assumption is not met, then an auction is either efficient and maximizes social welfare or it maximizes the buyer's utility. If the bidders are risk-averse, then a winning bid that maximizes the buyer's utility may be further improved through negotiations. It is possible to introduce side-payments which increase utility values of both the buyer and the seller.


    Zugriff

    Zugriff prüfen

    Verfügbarkeit in meiner Bibliothek prüfen

    Bestellung bei Subito €


    Exportieren, teilen und zitieren



    Titel :

    Improving Successful A+B Procurement Auctions with Negotiations


    Beteiligte:


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2015-01-01


    Format / Umfang :

    236006 byte





    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch



    Efficient auctions for distributed transportation procurement

    Xu, Su Xiu / Huang, George Q. | Elsevier | 2014



    On winners and losers in procurement auctions

    Kersten, Gregory E. / Wachowicz, Tomasz | IEEE | 2014


    Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective

    Song, J. / Regan, A. / National Research Council | British Library Conference Proceedings | 2003


    Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective

    Song, Jiongjiong / Regan, Amelia | Transportation Research Record | 2003