AbstractPrivate toll roads are now seriously considered as an alternative to public (free-access) road infrastructure. Nevertheless, complete private provision without governmental control is only rarely considered. A main consideration against private roads would be that operators would be primarily interested in maximizing profits, which – given the market power they will have – will typically not lead to welfare-maximizing tolls and capacities. An important question is whether these discrepancies can be mitigated by a proper design of auctions for concessions of private roads. This paper therefore analyses capacity choice and toll setting by private investors in a competitive bidding framework organized by the government. We develop a two-link network simulation model with an untolled alternative to determine relative efficiency effects, and analyze rules for the government to organize the bidding process such that a more desired (welfare optimal) outcome is achieved. Our results show that, depending on the design of the auction, its outcomes may vary strongly, and may approach the maximum possible (second-best) welfare gains.


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    Titel :

    Auctioning concessions for private roads


    Beteiligte:
    Ubbels, Barry (Autor:in) / Verhoef, Erik T. (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2005-10-01


    Format / Umfang :

    18 pages




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch




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