Highlights Quantity decision timing preference under spillover effect and asymmetric information is studied. Signaling game based approach is employed to derive the equilibria. Chain members’ preferences are jointly determined by spillover effect and asymmetric information. Certain conditions are identified where chain members achieve consensus on the decision timing.
Abstract This study investigates how the spillover effect of retail service investment affects timing preference of quantity decision in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric demand information. The manufacturer-quantity-leader game and retailer-quantity-leader game are considered. Applying a signaling game-theoretic approach, we show that, for the chain members, whether to occupy the quantity decision leadership or not is conditional on the spillover intensity and the demand information value. We also identify certain conditions where the chain members can achieve a consensus on the quantity decision timing.
Quantity decision timing with spillover effect and asymmetric demand information
2020-07-25
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Elsevier | 2019
|Operator decision making: information on demand
British Library Conference Proceedings | 1995
|Operator decision making: information on demand
British Library Conference Proceedings | 1995
|