Highlights This paper considers fairness in coordinating a closed-loop supply chain. Based on the classic Shapley value, we propose an weighted coordination approach. Consider a supply chain consisting a manufacturer, a retailer and a remanufacturer. Given fairness concerns, we focus on how to allocate the centralized-setting profit. We prove that our model conditionally outperforms the classic Shapley value.
Abstract This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) structure in which a manufacturer allows a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer to sell and remanufacture his products, respectively. Given the retailer’s distributional fairness concerns, we investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions and profits under five non-cooperative and cooperative game models, and focus on how to allocate maximum profit in a centralized setting. Based on the classic Shapley value, we propose an innovative weighted allocation approach-namely, the variable-weighted Shapley value-to coordinate this CLSC. Numerical studies demonstrate that when remanufactured products are lowly accepted by consumers, our model outperforms the classic Shapley value.
Coordinating a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns through variable-weighted Shapley values
2019-04-22
27 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Coordination of a supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns
Elsevier | 2022
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