AbstractA one-shot simultaneous game-theoretic model is applied in a duopoly market to investigate how airport landing fees could influence airlines’ decisions on aircraft size and service frequency. It is found that higher landing fees will force airlines to use larger aircraft and less frequency, with higher load factor for the same number of passengers. It is also found that airlines will be better off if some of the extra landing fees are returned to airlines as a bonus for airlines using larger aircraft, which consequently reduces airport congestion.
Impact of landing fees on airlines’ choice of aircraft size and service frequency in duopoly markets
Journal of Air Transport Management ; 12 , 6 ; 288-292
2006-01-01
5 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Impact of landing fees on airlines' choice of aircraft size and service frequency in duopoly markets
Online Contents | 2006
|Airlines’ competition in aircraft size and service frequency in duopoly markets
Online Contents | 2007
|