Abstract In the maritime transport industry, a terminal concession often specifies the competition conditions during the concession period. This study proposes a game model with which the effects of competition for seaport terminal awards can be studied. The modeling results suggest that (a) a terminal operator always prefers to control more terminals in the region; (b) if all terminal operators expand their operations to every port, they will be worse off due to an increase of inter- and intra-port competitions, a situation similar to the prisoners׳ dilemma; and (c) when a port authority has significant market power, it prefers to introduce inter- and intra-port competition, rather than allowing one operator to monopolize all terminals. (d) multiple equilibria may be observed in concession awarding depending on market characteristics associated to a particular market. Anecdotal observations consistent with these modeling results are presented and discussed.

    Highlights A non-cooperative game with Inter- and intra-port competition. Four scenarios are analysed analytically. Explains a wide range of port concession arrangements observed.


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    Titel :

    Modeling the effects of competition on seaport terminal awarding


    Beteiligte:
    Yip, Tsz Leung (Autor:in) / Liu, John Jianhua (Autor:in) / Fu, Xiaowen (Autor:in) / Feng, Jiejian (Autor:in)

    Erschienen in:

    Transport Policy ; 35 ; 341-349


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2014-01-01


    Format / Umfang :

    9 pages




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch





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