Abstract This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.
Non-aviation revenues and their implications for airport regulation
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review ; 47 , 5 ; 755-763
2011-02-08
9 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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