Abstract This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.


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    Titel :

    Non-aviation revenues and their implications for airport regulation


    Beteiligte:
    Kratzsch, Uwe (Autor:in) / Sieg, Gernot (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2011-02-08


    Format / Umfang :

    9 pages




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch