Based on game theory, this paper explores two pedestrian twice-crossing game benefit models under different situations. In a un-signal controlled road section, pedestrians and vehicles compete to obtain the right to cross the crosswalk, pedestrian, and drivers choose their own behavior according to the real traffic conditions and their character. Pedestrian twice-crossing behavior can be seen as the process of game behavior. The party in the process of the game obtains the right to cross, and the other party chooses to avoid and wait. This paper describes the game process between pedestrians and drivers, analyzes the characteristics of pedestrian behavior including crossing-speed, psychology, and delay. Finally, this paper studies the pedestrians’ twice-crossing behavior on the southern section of Xiao ZHAI CBD crosswalk in Xi’an, and uses the pedestrian twice-crossing game benefit models to evaluate the setting of the crossing traffic facility and the management of the traffic control department.
Study on Pedestrian Twice-Crossing Behavior Based on Game Theory
19th COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals ; 2019 ; Nanjing, China
CICTP 2019 ; 6212-6220
2019-07-02
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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